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Marek Kulisz
The Identity of the Commander - 
Nomad Organization Against the State
In Geronimo, a film by Walter Hill, there is a scene in which a detachment 
of US cavalry encounters in the mountains of Arizona a small group of Chir- 
icahua Apache warriors. The Indians, single file as usual, appear unexpectedly 
on the left at a distance of a few hundred metres, a kilometre perhaps, and for 
a minute or so the two parties ride parallel to each other slowly and gingerly. 
Suddenly the Indian who heads the file starts galloping towards the US cav­
alrymen. Their commander, lieutenant Charles Gatewood, raises his hand to 
stop the column and alone rides forward about a hundred metres, then stops. 
The galloping Apache also stops and begins to shout to Gatewood.
In the column behind Gatewood there is a young lieutenant who has re­
cently graduated from a military academy and has been in the field for a few 
weeks only. He is puzzled by the situation, so he asks an Apache scout 
employed by the US army about what is happening. The scout explains that 
the warriors they have just encountered are a raiding party that has split off 
from Geronimo, and that the warrior who has left the file and galloped towards 
them challenges Gatewood to fight; he wants to show the others that he is 
brave.
Gatewood neither moves nor says anything. The Apache draws out his pistol 
and shoots at him but they are too far away from each other for the shot to 
be accurate. So the Apache spurs his horse and continuing to fire his pistol 
at Gatewood starts galloping towards him. Gatewood waits a few seconds, then 
forces his horse to lie down, hides behind the animal, draws out his rifle, takes 
careful aim and kills the Indian with a single shot. The duel is over. Both the 
Apaches and the Bluecoats remain silent and motionless for a while, then the 
Apaches ride away.
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If we examine the duel in the context of the film’s plot, we may come to 
the conclusion that the scene is redundant; the story would not lose any of its 
coherence if the scene were cut out. But on the cultural and political plane the 
scene appears to be of crucial importance, almost indispensable to the under­
standing of the film, because it reveals one of the essential differences between 
the nomad organization and the State, and in this way gives us an insight into 
what happened when the USA expanded west of the Mississippi River, into 
the Great Plains - the land of the North American nomads.
We are told in the film that the Apache who challenged lieutenant Gate­
wood wanted to show the others that he was brave. But what he did, and 
especially the way he did it, looked very reckless, almost suicidal. The ques­
tion, then, is whether he wanted to do it, or whether he, in a sense, had to. The 
answer that imposes itself is that he did have to if he wanted to remain in 
command.
In an attempt to explain the Apache’s apparently reckless behaviour, ref­
erence to Elias Canetti’s analysis of the command (order) may prove useful? 
He looks for the origins of the command in the animal world. According to 
him “Commands are older than speech. If this were not so, dogs could not 
understand them. Animals can be trained because they can be taught to un­
derstand what is required of them without understanding speech.”1 2 The orig­
inal command is that given by a stronger animal to a weaker one of a different 
species on which the stronger one preys. It is a command to flee. If the weaker 
animal does not escape, it will be eaten. The original command developed from 
a threat of death:
For the roar of the lion is a death sentence. It is the one sound in its lan­
guage which all its victims understand; this threat may be the only thing they 
have in common, widely different as they otherwise are. The oldest com­
mand - and it is far older than man - is a death sentence, and it compels the 
victim to flee. We should remember this when we come to discuss human 
commands. Beneath all commands glints the harshness of the death sentence.3
Though we may find parts of Canetti’s argument not entirely convincing, we 
have to admit that what he writes about the link between the command and 
the death sentence is undoubtedly true in the case of the armed forces - es­
pecially in wartime, when it is made clear to all soldiers that there is a court 
martial with its threat of death behind almost every command.4
1 Cf. the chapter entitled “The Command” in E. Canetti, Crowds and Power, trans. 
C. Stewart (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981).
2 Ibid., p. 351.
3 Ibid., p. 352.
4 Canetti is aware, of course, that human commands are more complex and that the obey- 
-or-die situations are rare. We may also point here to other easily distiguishable forces behind/ 
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It is crucial that we mention the court martial in our analysis, because it 
shows that the army detached the death sentence from the body that issues 
commands; in effect, the power of a command does not come from the officer 
who gives the command. He may even be incompetent and despised by his 
soldiers, yet his orders will still be obeyed; instances of insubordination are 
statistically very rare.5 To use Canetti’s simile we could say that if a command 
is a roar, then it is certainly not the officer who is the lion. At best, he might 
be the lion’s throat. It is the court martial that has in part assumed the role of 
the lion (“in part” because it is not the source of a command).6
Canetti’s analysis is certainly very interesting and seminal too, but from our 
perspective it has a serious shortcoming: it fails to distinguish between two basic 
types of commanders - the officer and the chieftain. By failing to make this 
distinction Canetti did not realize that in fact he was not writing about the 
command in general, but only about one type of command.
The officer holds office; he is part of an institution. He was placed in his 
position by his superiors, literally by the people “from above” (Latin superus 
means “placed above”). The power of his commands is thus the power of the 
institution; it is not his power. Very often he does not even give commands 
himself but only passes down those he has received from above, and then it 
becomes clear that he is a transmitter (a new kind of herald), a representative, 
a proxy. The State, especially in its modern form, turns the whole army into 
a proxy. The commander-in-chief of the world’s most powerful army, that of 
the USA, is the President, i.e. a civilian, and the head of NATO, the world’s 
most powerful military organization, is a civilian too. The officer of the highest 
rank in the armed forces is still only a recipient of commands. Indeed, the State 
puts a lot of effort into preventing the army from becoming the source of 
a command - into averting the danger of the army turning itself into a true lion.
/beneath the command. For example, a soldier may feel compelled to obey orders out of pa­
triotism - to defend his motherland invaded by enemies; or he may understand that a group 
of which he is a member will survive in a dangerous and traumatic situation only through 
joint and well-organized action, which often means obeying the orders given by an experi­
enced commander (a situation not infrequent at sea, which became one of Joseph Conrad’s 
favourite themes). But no matter how complex the forces behind a command may be, the 
threat of death never disappears: “Amongst men they [commands] have become so systema­
tized that death is normally avoided, but the threat and the fear of it is always contained in 
them; and the continued pronouncement and execution of real death sentences keeps alive the 
fear of every individual command and of commands in general.” Crowds and Power, p. 352.
5 One can argue that it is largely due to their rareness that instances of group insubordi­
nation - such as the mutiny aboard HMS Bounty - became widely known and are stored in 
popular imagination as adventure stories, as if they were equally improbable.
6 We should not be misled here by the fact that in the past officers were sometimes given 
the right to kill soldiers on the spot for their disobedience. It only means that the officers 
were allowed - always for the time being only! - to act in the name of the court martial.
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The idea of officership implies that the three elements of a command which 
appear together in the lion are distributed among three bodies: the officer, who 
is the giver, often nothing more than a pronouncer, of commands; the court 
martial, which is the death-threatener, sometimes the executioner; and the State, 
which is the source of a command.
However, Canetti’s lion theory, though original and inspiring, is not appli­
cable to chieftainship. To explain why let us refer to a brief note about the 
Bedouin which Immanuel Kant makes in his essay on history. Kant is worth 
quoting at this point not because he can be regarded as an expert on nomadism 
and chieftainship, but because he was one of the first to say very explicitly 
that the nomad organization opposes the State. If so, then we can assume that 
the chieftain, who is an essential part of the nomad organization, must stand 
in a similar opposition to the officer, who represents the State. The note reads 
as follows:
The Bedouins of Arabia still describe themselves as children of a former 
sheikh, the founder of their tribe [...] But the sheikh is by no means their 
master, and he cannot force his will upon them as he chooses. For in a nation 
of herdsmen, no one has fixed property which he cannot take with him, so 
that any family which is discontented with its tribe can easily leave it and 
join forces with another.7
To make the picture of the sheikh a little more complete, we can supplement 
Kant’s remarks by saying that in Bedouin communities the leader is elected, 
71. Kant, “Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History”, in Kant: Political Writ­
ings, ed. H. Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
p. 230. And in order to demonstrate that what Kant says about the Bedouin sheikh is in fact 
true of any chieftain in a nomadic community, let us quote a passage describing the prob­
lems which Red Cloud, a famous Sioux chieftain, had with his warriors:
Again Red Cloud refused to interfere. He was not surprised when many of the protesters packed up, disman­
tled their tepees, and started back north to spend the winter off the reservation. They had proved to him that 
there were still Sioux warriors who would never take lightly any invasion of Paha Sapa, yet apparently Red 
Cloud did not realize that he was losing these young men forever. They had rejected his leadership for that of 
Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse, neither of whom had ever lived on a reservation or taken the white man’s hand­
outs.
D. Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee (London: Vintage, Random House, 1991), 
p. 278. [Italics mine.]
The State does not tolerate in its army any such “rejections of leadership”. They are la­
belled desertion or treason and are punishable by death. Even the civil administration of 
a democratic country - though it grants one a lot of freedom - makes one obey the com­
mands of those who have won the elections, and it does not matter in the least whether one 
has voted for them or not. It is even quite possible that one may spend one’s whole life be­
ing governed by people whom, personally, one has never accepted as leaders; the same may 
be true of one’s workplace.
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and that his position is seen as that of the “first among equals”; his power 
consists in arbitrating rather than issuing commands.8
The chieftain of a nomadic tribe is not their master, he cannot force his will 
upon his people. The difference between the chieftain and the officer begins 
to manifest itself already when we try to choose the right words to describe 
the two commanders. For example, we have called the recipients of the chief­
tain’s commands “his people,” because in no way could we refer to them as 
“his subordinates” or “his inferiors” (Claude Lévi-Strauss, for example, when 
writing about chieftainship in Mato Grosso, calls the recipients of the chief’s 
commands “his fellow-members of the group” and “his companions”). It is 
enough to take a look at a picture of any Cheyenne or Sioux warrior and try 
to think of him as somebody’s subordinate to see that one cannot help but laugh 
at the preposterousness of such an idea.
The chieftain’s commands do not contain a death threat, often no threats 
at all, because he himself is not a threatener and there is no authority above 
or behind him that would attach such a threat to his commands. A chieftain 
cannot be characterized as powerful. Deleuze and Guattari say that within 
communities which have chiefs there are “diffuse, collective mechanisms” or 
“mechanisms of inhibition” that prevent the chief from acquiring stable power 
and make it impossible for him to become a man of State.9 In practice, such 
mechanisms radically reduce the power of his commands.
One of these preventive mechanisms, essential to our analysis, is the dis­
persion of wealth - a complete reversal of what we find among the sedentaries 
of the State. In the note about the Bedouin, Kant makes it very explicit that 
there is a close link between the command and property (a link which Canetti 
seemed to have overlooked, though it is no less important than the one between 
the command and death). A command appears to be a kind of blackmail, the 
use of which is possible only among the owners of immovable property. Those 
who have not got such property cannot be forced to obey orders.
It is never, of course, as simple as that, but basically Kant is right. The 
problem is that he did not enquire fully into the consequences of the blackmail 
nor did he ask who the blackmailers were. Perhaps he found the answer to be 
8 Cf. B. Lewis, The Arabs in History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). I use the 
Polish translation: B. Lewis, Arabowie w historii, trans. J. Danecki (Warszawa: Państwowy 
Instytut Wydawniczy, 1995), p. 36. Bernard Lewis also writes that in the nomadic commu­
nities of Arabia the sheikh did not have at his diposal any means of coercion, and that in 
fact such notions as power, rule, public punishment, etc. were regarded with abhorrence among 
the Arabian nomads. Ibid., pp. 36-37.
9 Cf. G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, “1227: Treatise on Nomadology - the War Machine”, 
in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Shizophrenia, trans. B. Massumi (London: The Ath- 
lone Press, 1992), pp. 357-358. The examples given by Deleuze and Guattari come from the 
works of P. Clastres, J. Meunier, and I. S. Bernstein.
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all too obvious: they have always been those who managed to accumulate much 
more than their neighbours. The reign of William the Conqueror is a good 
example (in fact the reign of almost any feudal king could be used as an 
example). William was very generous and granted a lot of land to his knights, 
but at the same time he saw to it that he possessed much more than anybody 
else. He understood very well that in order to be in effective control of the 
country, he had to be the chief possessor, the first landlord.
Nowadays we find it difficult to imagine that property could be the source 
of almost unlimited power, which really turned commands into death sen­
tences.
In 1194 the crusading knight, Henry of Champagne, paid a visit to the head­
quarters of the Assassins at the castle at al-Kahf [...] Henry was sumptuously 
received. In one of the more impressive entertainments a succession of the 
loyal members of the cult, at a word from the Sheik, expertly immolated them­
selves. Before and ever since, the willing obedience of a household coterie 
has been a source of similar satisfaction to those able to command it. Wealth 
has been the most prominent device by which it has been obtained.10 *
Real property, then, creates not only the recipients but also the issuers of 
commands. Most people, of course, would prefer to be on the issuers’ side 
because no one likes receiving commands: “an action performed as the result 
of a command [...] is experienced and remembered as something alien, some­
thing not really our own.”11 The sedentary, however, is left with little choice. 
In order to move from the position of the recipient of commands to that of the 
issuer he has to accumulate wealth. Although there is no clear dividing line 
between those who obey and those in authority, a certain general tendency is 
easily discernable: the more one accumulates, the fewer commands are direct­
ed at the person, until finally one becomes a master.
Within the areas controlled by the State accumulation of wealth has always 
been the sedentary’s dream irrespective of social class. The aristocracy had the 
force to divide among themselves the whole land of their native and conquered 
countries. Those of simple birth could not do it but they wished they could: 
in folktales the hero, a humble peasant boy, is very often rewarded with 
a kingdom, or at least half of it, for his acts of bravery. Fame, admiration, 
respect, etc. are not a sufficient reward. Ultimately, it is only the possesion of 
land, real(!) property, that counts. The king’s daughter, who is part of the reward, 
10 J. K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1962), pp. 81- 
82. [Italics mine.] Galbraith speaks of wealth in general, but it is obvious that among the 
sedentaries it has always been the immovable property that counted most. Even now, at the 
end of the 20th century, investments in real property are said to be the safest ones.
" Crowds and Power, p. 353.
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only confirms the hero’s new status - now he is the master. Likewise, the middle 
classes, who came into existence as a result of accumulation of wealth, told 
their stories in the novel, in which the theme of becoming rich was for a long 
time a central one.12
Expressions of the sedentary’s aspirations to achieve a leading position 
through the accumulation of wealth are indeed very numerous, but few people 
put it as bluntly as Tevye the milkman in Fiddler on the Roof. Tevye sings that 
if he were a rich man, he not only would not have to work hard, but would 
also become a highly esteemed figure in the community. “If I were a rich man,” 
says Tevye, then “the most important men in town will come to fawn on me. 
They’ll ask me to advise them like a Solomon wise. [...] And it won’t make 
one bit of difference if I answer right or wrong - when you’re rich, they think 
you really know.”
The position Tevye dreams of attaining is something extreme; there is no 
exaggeration in the way he describes it. In their societal development the 
sedentaries have reached a stage in which accumulated wealth makes such an 
overwhelming impression that people no longer have to be forced to obey 
commands, they ask for them.13 Apparently, it is advice that they seek, not 
12 Ian Watt in his essay on Robinson Crusoe analyses the way in which the novel re­
flected the drive towards accumulation of wealth:
Defoe’s plot, then, expresses some of the most important tendencies of the life of his time, and it is this which 
sets his hero apart from most of the travellers in literature. Robinson Crusoe is not, like Autolycus, a commercial 
traveller rooted in an extended but still familiar locality: nor is he, like Ulysses, an unwilling voyager trying to 
gel back to his family and his native land: profit is Crusoe's only vocation, and the whole world is his territory. 
The primacy of individual economic advantage has tended to diminish the importance of personal as well as 
group relationships....
I. Watt, The Rise of the Novel (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981), p. 74. [Italics mine.]
13 Claude Lévi-Strauss gives an account of a master-servant relationship that is even more 
extreme. In the poverty-stricken communities in India, where the huge gap between the rich 
and the poor is justified and made unbridgeable by the caste system, anybody who appears 
to be fairly well-off is literally forced to accept the position of a master. There is something 
weird in the relationship, as the “servants” command the “master” to give them commands:
The gulf separating extreme luxury' and extreme poverty destroys the human dimension. [...] Every European 
in India finds himself surrounded, whether he likes it or not, by a fair number of general manservants, called 
bearers. I cannot say whether their eagerness to serve is to be explained by the caste system, the tradition of 
social inequality or the demand for service on the part of the colonizers. However, their obsequiousness very 
quickly has the effect of making the atmosphere intolerable. If necessary, they would lie down on the ground 
to let you walk over them, [...] Each time, they are there at once, begging for orders. [...] And if your behav­
iour does not correspond to their expectations, if you do not behave on all occasions like their former British 
masters, their universe collapses.
C. Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, trans. J.& D. Weightman (London: Picador Classics, 
Pan Books, 1989), pp. 174-175. Lévi-Strauss claims that any attempt to change the relation­
ship, to treat a fellow human being as your equal, is immediately rejected: “If one tried to 
treat these unfortunate wretches [beggars] as equals, they would protest against the injustice 
of one’s doing so; they do not want to be equal; they beg, they entreat you to crush them 
with your pride, since it is from the widening of the gap between you and them that they 
expect their mite.” Ibid., p. 172.
158 Marek Kulisz
commands. But at the same time they accept a rich man as their leader, which 
turns his pieces of advice into commands, though subtler in form and degree 
than those in the army.14
A chieftain may also use property to gain power, but in a radically oppo­
site way: by giving away instead of accumulating. Dispersion of wealth is one 
of the distinctive features of chieftainship. Anthropologists who write about 
chiefs often mention a ceremony called potlatch as an example of such dis­
persion. “A potlatch is a public distribution of goods and the holder of a potlatch 
makes a claim to status on the basis of his power to give. [...] The system is 
fiercely competitive with each holder trying to outdo rivals in generosity.”15 
At the end of such a ceremony, which may last for a number of days, its holder 
can be deprived of his property altogether, but his gain in honour and prestige 
is by far bigger.16
Potlatch is a ceremony organized among the Kwakiutl, who were not 
a nomadic tribe (not at the time when the first colonists reached the west coast 
of Canada), but the same give-away mechanisms not only are to be found among 
nomads, but are crucial to their social organization. The Mongols, for exam­
ple, had a law which stated that all the spoils of war belonged to the commu­
nity and not to the chief or any other individual. Claude Lévi-Strauss reports 
that among the Nambikwara, a (semi-) nomadic tribe of the Mato Grosso 
Plateau, the chief’s “primary and principal instrument of power lies in his 
generosity.”17
Although the chief does not seem to be in a privileged position as regards 
material belongings, he must have at his disposal a surplus of food, weap­
ons and ornaments [...] When an individual, a family or the group as a whole 
feel a desire or a need for something, they turn to the chief. It follows that 
generosity is the main quality expected of a new chief. [...] There can be no 
doubt that, in this respect, the chief’s capacities are exploited to the utmost. 
[...] as a general rule, the chief remained just as poor as he had been when I 
arrived. Everything he had been given [...] had already been extorted from 
him.18
14 J. K. Galbraith says that “Broadly speaking, there are three basic benefits from wealth. 
First is the satisfaction in the power with which it endows the individual. Second is the physi­
cal possession of the things which money can buy. Third is the distinction or esteem that 
accrues to the rich man as the result of his wealth.” The Affluent Society, p. 80. [Italics mine.] 
Since wealth brings the sedentary both power and esteem, the distinction between his com­
mands and pieces of advice will, at least in certain situations, be blurred.
13 “Potlatch,” in The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, eds. A. Bullock, 
O.Stallybrass, and S.Trombley (London: Fontana Press, 1988).
16 Cf. the chapter on the Indians living on the north-western coast written by Victoria 
Wyatt, in Native Americans, ed. R. Collins (Salamander Books Ltd, 1991).
17 Tristes Tropiques, p. 408.
18 Ibid., p. 408. [Italics mine.]
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You are what you give, one is tempted to say. The chief has a surplus and yet 
remains poor; this was something the European colonists could not possibly 
understand. Victoria Wyatt writes that when in the early 19th century, in the 
northwest, trade in fur skins increased the Indians’ affluence, they used the 
wealth to support their rites and cultural activities: in the first few decades after 
the trade had developed they organized more potlatch ceremonies than ever 
before.19 The more they got, the more they gave away. Chieftains use accu­
mulation of wealth only to increase its dispersion.
But to say that a chieftain is generous is not sufficient: we would still not 
be able to tell the difference between the chief and the king, who also had the 
obligation to be generous. We have already mentioned William the Conqueror, 
and Canetti gives us a vivid account of the reign of Muhammad Tughlak, 
a Sultan of Dehli, who used to make a dazzling display of his generosity:
On one of his [the Sultan’s] entries into the capital I saw three or four small 
catapults placed on elephants throwing gold and silver coins amongst the peo­
ple from the moment he entered the city until he reached the palace.20
The king’s generosity and that of the chieftain are two different things. The 
king has to be both generous and greedy. If he allows anybody in his kingdom 
to possess more than he does, then he is almost sure to be overthrown. In some 
cases it may lead not only to a change on the throne but also to a disintegration 
of the state. (The Poland of the 18th century is a particularly good example 
of such a disintegration caused to a large extent by the fact that some of those 
who were nominally the king’s vassals became more powerful - i.e. they 
possessed more - than the king himself.)
There is, then, a clearly defined limit to the king’s generosity, while there 
seems to be no limit to his greed. This greed is in fact the greed of the State, 
and it does not really matter who represents it, the king or a democratically 
elected president. If it is true that the surplus produced by agriculture was one 
of the decisive factors that sparkled the development of the sedentary’s civ­
ilization, it may also be true that the tendency towards accumulation has re­
mained a permanent feature of this civilization, especially within the State, 
where the tendency is most conspicuous. It is tellingly significant that the word 
weal, now out of use, meant both wealth and the State.
In the film Geronimo a conversation occurs between the chieftain and 
general Crook. Geronimo has escaped from a reservation and keeps fighting 
against the white settlers. Crook tries to persuade him to surrender, which to 
Geronimo means being sent from Arizona to a reservation in Florida. Geroni­
19 Cf. Native Americans, the chapter on the tribes of the north-western coast.
20 Crowds and Power, p. 496. The passage comes from a description made by Ibn Batuta, 
a famous Arab traveller.
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mo asks why in such a huge country there is no room for the Apaches, why 
it is that the white man wants all land.21 A long silence follows; Crook does 
not answer the question.
Geronimo, a war chief, does not understand a culture that was founded on 
the accumulation of wealth. He himself possesses nothing and yet he is a chief. 
(The yet in the sentence indicates that it has been written from the perspective 
of a man of State, because one does not become a chief in spite of having 
nothing. A nomad would say: he is a chief so/therefore he has got nothing.) 
Though anthropologists often speak of the chief’s generosity, it is probably 
imprecise to say that a chief is generous because generosity, as our brief analysis 
of kingship has revealed, does not exclude greed. Chieftainship, in fact, im­
plies total greedlessness, sometimes even a kind of reversal of greed - 
a necessity to possess nothing, or very little.22
A chieftain can threaten his people with neither death nor loss of property. 
If we accepted as generally true what Canetti and Kant say about the mech­
anisms of a command, we would have to admit that a chieftain is not able to 
give a single command, but that is obviously not the case. A chieftain is in 
command of his people. The question is what makes this command possible. 
To find the answer we shall again refer to potlatch. I have presented the 
ceremony as a preventive, negative mechanism that makes it impossible for an 
individual to become a certain type of leader - one with stable power based 
on the accumulation of wealth. But potlatch has also a creative, positive func­
tion: it gives the individual the opportunity to assume leadership of a different 
kind. This other kind of leadership, however, is not based on dispersion; to the 
holder of a potlatch distribution of goods is only a means; the objective, as has 
already been mentioned, is to gain prestige.
21 On the last page of Bury My Heart At Wounded Knee there is a photograph of chief 
Red Cloud in old age with the following quotation: “They made us many promises, more 
than I can remember, but they never kept but one; they promised to take our land, and they 
took it.”
Today the State may appear to be less greedy for land, but that is because all the land 
has already been taken. If, however, a state is threatened with a loss of a tiny bit of its terrtory, 
it immediately mobilizes its force in order to defend it. Recent history provides enough ex­
amples, such as the war over the Falkland Islands or the conflict over the Kurile Islands. In 
Russia the idea of returning the islands to Japan is unthinkable, though obviously Russia would 
profit a lot from such a deal, because it would normalize the relations between the two coun­
tries and make it possible for the Japanese capital and technology to flow into Russia.
22 Leonard Cohen, in his song The Night Comes On, gives a poetic account of what can 
be called a reversal of greed, a state of mind, a mode of being perhaps, which cannot be 
equated with generosity because generosity is only a “by-product”, a kind of positive side 
effect of such a state:
I needed so much
To have nothing to touch
I’ve always been greedy that way
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Whenever one reads about chieftains, one also reads about prestige: “Clas- 
tres describes the situation of the chief, who has no instituted weapon other 
than his prestige, no other means of persuasion, no other rule than his sense 
of the group’s desires.”23 Lévi-Strauss writes that “Personal prestige and the 
ability to inspire confidence are the basis of power in Nambikwara society.”24 
It is not out of politeness that travellers and anthropologists speak of chiefs 
as exceptional individuals. Prestige is a conditio sine qua non for chieftainship: 
a chieftain must be held in high esteem by his tribe, otherwise he simply ceases 
to be the chief. Personal prestige is not what merely helps him to achieve the 
position of the leader; prestige is indispensable, first to attain the position, then 
to maintain it. The chieftain can never take his leadership for granted; he has 
to invest continuous effort into maintaining it.
In this respect Canetti’s theory of the command again stands in sharp contrast 
to chieftainship. According to Canetti
The power behind a command must not be open to doubt; if it has fallen into 
abeyance it must be ready to prove itself again by force. But it is astonish­
ing how seldom fresh proofs are called for, how long the original proof suf­
fices. Success in conflict is perpetuated by commands; every command 
obeyed is an old victory won again. The power of those who give commands 
appears to grow all the time.25
Among the nomads it is exactly the other way round: the power behind 
a command is open to doubt; it is not allowed to prove itself by force. It is 
astonishing how frequently fresh proofs are called for, how the original proof 
does not suffice. Success in conflict is not perpetuated by commands. The power 
of those who give commands does not grow all the time. It is really striking 
how diametrically opposed the two types of leadership are; this opposition very 
well confirms Deleuze and Guattari’s argument when they question the evo­
lutionary model according to which there was some sort of linear or nonlinear 
passage “from clans to empires” or “from bands to kingdoms.” When chiefs 
become kings, when a band changes into a kingdom, it is like the swing of the 
pendulum; it is certainly not an evolutionary change from the lower-worse-less 
organized into the higher-better-more organized.26
Needless to say, the adoption of the nonevolutionary model changes quite 
considerably our views on the origins and development of the mechanisms of 
power. For example, we can no longer follow Lévi-Strauss when he places 
23 “1227: Treatise on Nomadology - the War Machine,” p. 357.
24 Tristes Tropiques, p. 407.
25 Crowds and Power, p. 363
26 Cf. “1227: Treatise on Nomadology - the War Machine,” pp. 359-360. “[...] bands 
and clans are no less organized than empire-kingdoms.”
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chieftainship among “the most rudimentary forms of power” and claims that 
the Nambikwara represent a “simple form of social organization.” Such a view 
is untenable, especially that Lévi-Strauss himself provides us with a strong 
argument against his theory. He has it that “underlying the most rudimentary 
forms of power, there is an essential feature which is something new in com­
parison with biological phenomena: this new element is consent. Power both 
originates in consent and is bounded by it.”27 (Consent of the governed; 
a chieftain, as we know, has to be accepted by his people because he has no 
powers of coercion.) Then, however, as society developed, things apparently 
got worse: “unilateral relationships, such as those characteristic of gerontoc­
racy, autocracy or any form of government, can arise in groups with an already 
complex structure. They are out of the question in simple forms of social 
organization, [,..]”28 In other words despotism, for example, should be seen as 
a product of a higher complexity of social organization. Now, according to the 
evolutionary theory it is parliamentary democracy that seems to be the most 
complex and advanced form of social organization, and its basic, fundamental 
feature is consent. All that amounts to saying that humanity placed consent at 
the basis of its societal development, then scrapped it and for millenia kept 
experimenting and making all kinds of mistakes, such as despotism, only to 
return to the original idea. Such a thesis is far from being plausible. More 
convincing is the theory according to which bands and kingdoms developed 
simultaneously, side by side, permeating and “contaminating” each other, 
perhaps forming all kinds of hybrids, but nevertheless remaining distinct.29
The State is not characterized by consent but by “voluntary servitude.”30 
Though one may argue that this servitude is a kind of consent too - a person 
voluntarily renounces his freedom - it is obviously an entirely different con­
sent, and Lévi-Strauss is well aware of the difference:
It is true that Rousseau’s analysis differs from the quasi-contractual relation­
ships which exist between the chief and his fellow-members of the group. 
Rousseau was thinking of a quite different phenomenon, namely the renun­
ciation by individuals of their particular independence in the interest of the 
general will. [...] Rousseau and his contemporaries displayed profound so­
27 Tristes Tropiques, p. 413.
28 Ibid., p. 413.
29 Deleuze and Guattari argue that “there has always been a State, quite perfect, quite 
complete. The more discoveries archaeologists make, the more empires they uncover. [...] It 
is hard to imagine primitive societies that would not have been in contact with imperial States, 
at the periphery or in poorly controlled areas. But of greater importance is the inverse hy­
pothesis: that the State itself has always been in a relation with an outside and is inconceiv­
able independent of that relationship.” “1227: Treatise on Nomadology - the War Machine,” 
p. 360.
30 Ibid., p. 359.
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ciological intuition in grasping the fact that cultural attitudes and features 
such as “contract” and “consent” are not secondary creations, [...] they are 
the basic material of social life, and it is impossible to imagine any form of 
political organization in which they would not be present.31
Lévi-Strauss admits that the consent given by a subject (citizen) is “a quite 
different phenomenon,” that it has nothing to do with the consent which char­
acterizes chieftainship, and yet he ends his argument with general statements 
in which the differences disappear: “contract and consent are [...] the basic 
material of social life,” and a few lines below he continues in the same vein 
by saying that “consent is the psychological basis of power.” To Lévi-Strauss, 
the differences between the two kinds of leadership are of little importance 
because he adheres to the evolutionary model according to which chieftain­
ship (primitive statelessnes) evolved into kingship, which makes it logical to 
assume that the State was to a large extent founded on the consent of the 
governed.
Let us repeat that we find it hardly possible to agree with the evolutionary 
approach. Firstly because kingship (institution) and chieftainship (prestige) 
actively oppose each other. It is true that sometimes the State “makes use” of 
prestige, but when we analyse the way in which the State functions in extreme 
situations, for instance during the war, we realize that prestige is not only 
unnecessary but may even be an obstacle to the functioning of the State. A good 
example is the situation in which a state’s existence is threatened. When in 
September 1939 Poland was invaded by the Nazi and Soviet armies, it very 
quickly became obvious to the Polish authorities that the country was not able 
to defend itself, and that the best if not the only way to save the state was to 
evacuate its institutions. In this way the government, which was internation­
ally recognized, was still able to represent the state, i.e. to continue its foreign 
policy, to recruit a new army, etc. But the decision to evacuate the state’s 
institutions was a very dramatic one because the government was immediately 
accused of abandoning the country’s people; political opponents, then and after 
the war, even spoke of treason. The choice which the Polish authorities faced 
was either to save the state or personal prestige, they could not have it both 
ways. Since their loyalty was to the state, they chose to give up personal 
prestige. The State can function without prestige, but it cannot without its 
institutions. Within the nomad organization, on the other hand, it is simply 
impossible that the chieftain will be forced to choose between prestige and 
something else. He will not be able to maintain his position without prestige.
The other reason why we cannot accept the theory that chieftainship evolved 
into kingship is because we have seen how easily the State slips from any kind 
31 Tristes Tropiques, pp. 413 414.
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of democracy (government legitimatized by consent) into the purest forms of 
despotism and dictatorship, e.g. changes such as in ancient Rome, from the 
republican government into that by the emperors, or in 20th-century Germany, 
from the Weimar Republic into the Third Reich. A reversed process - a change 
from despotism to democracy - takes much more effort and time. Even today 
democracy is still a fragile construction that must be constantly defended. The 
consent of the governed can in no way be thought of as immanent in the State, 
whereas coercion certainly can.
Consent is immanent in the nomad organization. It is, to a large extent, in 
any community led by a chief, but with nomads it is most conspicuous. The 
social organization of the Nambikwara tribe is particularly interesting to study 
as it reveals that consent among nomads means a lot more than it has ever meant 
within the State. It can already be deduced from what Kant says about the 
Bedouin that consent is given by the community to the chief but always tem­
porarily, that “The chief [...] is always in danger of being disavowed, aban­
doned by his people.”32 Lévi-Strauss writes that “The Nambikwara chief has 
a difficult part to play; he has to exert himself in order to maintain his posi­
tion. What is more, if he does not constantly improve it, he runs the risk of 
losing what it has taken him months or years to achieve.”33 But again we are 
imprecise, or even wrong, when we say that consent is given by the commu­
nity because consent is what forms the community:
In the initial community, there are men who are recognized as leaders: it is 
they who form the nuclei around which the groups assemble. The size of the 
group and its greater or lesser degree of stability during a given period are 
proportionate to the ability of the particular chief to maintain his rank and 
improve his position. Political power does not appear to result from the needs 
of the community; it is the group rather which owes its form, size and even 
origin to the potential chief who was there before it came into being.34
Consent, then, cannot be given, i.e. it cannot be voiced, because it precedes 
the community, it is the formation of a community or a group that indicates to 
the chief that the consent is already there. That is why we say that consent is 
immanent in the nomad organization. What Lévi-Strauss writes about the nature 
of power - that it both originates in consent and is bounded by it - is true only 
of the nomads.
32 “1227: Treatise on Nomadology - the War Machine,” p. 357.
33 Tristes Tropiques, p. 415
34 Tristes Tropiques, p. 404. [Italics mine.] A few pages below Lévi-Strauss repeats the 
observation in a more terse manner: “[...] the chief is seen as the cause of the group’s desire 
to exist as a group, and not as the result of the need for a central authority felt by some al­
ready established group.” Ibid., p. 407.
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And once more it appears that our vocabulary is inadequate. If the chief­
tain is a noncoercionist - the exact opposite of the despot - then we cannot 
associate him with power. “Power is the ability of its holders to exact com­
pliance or obedience of other individuals to his will, on whatsoever basis.”35 
The chieftain is not able to exact compliance, he “is more like a leader or a star 
than a man of power.”36 Star is a very appropriate word to describe the chief­
tain because he can be in command only when he is admired. Prestige, which 
is his principal instrument of command (we can no longer use the word “pow­
er”) is defined by The Oxford English Dictionary as “blinding or dazzling 
influence.” The chief “shines”; he is a star.
Let us now return to the scene of the duel from Geronimo with which we 
began this essay. What the young Apache does seems reckless; it is an unnec­
essary display of bravery, which costs him his life. We asked why he should 
risk his life in such a way. His opponent, a US cavalry officer, behaves in a way 
that we perceive as much more sensible. But we have to realize that this 
perception, or perspective, is that of the man of the State, it is not a universal 
perspective from which all actions can be judged. The perspective of the nomad, 
and especially the nomad warrior, involves entirely different principles.
Let us try to find out what the young Apache could do if he wanted to be 
a (war) chief. He was among his equals. He could not threaten them with death 
or loss of property. He had got nothing so he could not be generous and was 
not able to “buy” their loyalty. He was not even older than his fellow warriors, 
which excluded any form of gerontocracy. To put it briefly, he was completely 
powerless. The only thing he could do was to live up to his warriors’ expec­
tations of him, which meant he had to be brave (actually, the word for a North 
American Indian warrior is a brave). That is how Geronimo, Sitting Bull, Gall, 
Crazy Horse, and many others became chieftains. They were intelligent and 
talented individuals but they also surpassed others in bravery.37 It is indeed 
a wonder that some of them managed to live to a ripe old age, especially that 
they were confronted with a powerful state apparatus that was determined to 
crush them. Nana, an Apache chief, who “had been fighting Spanish-speaking 
white men and English-speaking white men as long as he could remember” 
surrendered when he was in his seventies. Even at this age his bravery and 
35 “Power,” in The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought.
36 “1227: Treatise on Nomadology - the War Machine,” p. 357.
37 “[...] the warrior himself is caught in a process of accumulating exploits leading him 
to solitude and a prestigious but powerless death.”
“1227: Treatise on Nomadology - the War Machine,” p. 357.
The scene of the duel from Geronimo shows that the US cavalry officer, lieutenant 
Gatewood, does not have to prove that he is brave. His refusal to take up the Apache’s chal­
lenge does not affect his position as a commander; his commands will be obeyed anyway. 
He shoots the Indian warrior in self-defence.
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determination to fight made it still possible for him to recruit a guerrilla army.38 
Fight was the only “commodity” he could offer to his followers.
It is, then, quite plain that Canetti was mistaken when he thought that he 
had discovered the basic forces behind a command. Roughly speaking, the scope 
of his archaeology of command is limited to the State. His main thesis that 
there is a death threat behind every command is untenable when we examine 
the position of the chieftain. And in the case of the war chief it is actually the 
reverse that is true, namely it is, as we have seen, the war chief who is threat­
ened with death, not his warriors: he has to risk his life in order to be accepted 
as a commander.
Despite some obvious shortcomings Canetti’s analysis is very important as 
it is one more confirmation that the nomad organization can by no means be 
regarded as merely a stage in the history of mankind, one which preceded 
sedentarism. Canetti, as we remember, argues that the history of the command 
is very long, longer than speech. But the fact that his presentation of this history 
is coherent, though it leaves the nomad out of account, indicates that there can 
be no such concept as the history of the command; there are at least two parallel 
and distinct histories. The other history, overlooked by Canetti, must have had 
a completely different beginning and an equally alternate development.
38 Bury My Heart At Wounded Knee, p. 401.
